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RUMINATIONS ON LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF
THINGS
Wex S. Malone*
Recent years have witnessed a ferment in Louisiana tort law.
Turmoil has centered around the required showing of negligence
traditionally imposed under article 2315 of the Civil Code. Although
disquiet in this area was discernible in the opinions as early as 1971
in Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.' and became increasingly obvious in several decisions shortly thereafter,' the tide of revolt did
not reach flood stage until 1975 with the opinion of Justice Tate in
Loescher v. Parr.' After an extensive review of both French and
Louisiana jurisprudence and doctrinal writing, Justice Tate announced
a new construct of tort liability under which the element of personal
wrongdoing is obviated in a very substantial number of litigated
cases. This liability attaches as a result of harm inflicted through
the acts of "defective" things. The attention of the court in the
Loescher case was centered on article 2317 of the Civil Code. This
provision follows close on the heels of the Fault article. It reads in
part:
we are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by our
own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for
whom we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our
custody....'
This article was interpreted by the Loescher court as affording
a unique source of tort liability which is quite independent of the
presence or absence of any showing of fault on the part of the custodian. Under this article it need only be shown, first, that the cause
of the harm was the act of a thing, second, that the thing was defective, and, finally, that the defective thing was in the custody of the
defendant when the harm was occasioned. When these requisites have
been established all the prima facie essentials to a recovery are

*

1.
2.

Boyd Professor Emeritus of Law, Louisiana State University.
258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
See, e.g., Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975); Holland v. Buckley, 305

So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
3. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
4. Emphasis added. The full text of Civil Code article 2317 reads as follows:
We are responsible, not only for, the damage occasioned by our own act, but
for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are answerable, or of
the things which we have in our custody. This, however, is to be understood with
the following modifications.
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satisfied. Thereafter if the defendant seeks to escape liability he
must do so by demonstrating that the cause of the mishap was
something foreign to the defect.
The following pages are devoted to a very compressed discus..
sion of the strengths and weaknesses of this novel thesis. No effort,
will be made in these pages to present a detailed consideration of
the many complexities that arise in interpreting and administering
the new doctrine. Such matters have been treated extensively by
others.' The only justification offered for the pages of discussion
here added is the interest of the writer in exploring along a more
critical vein than he has discovered elsewhere.' I venture to ques.
tion the wisdom of recognizing and attempting to put into operation
a thesis of liability for the acts of things. I want to discover what
prompted the courts to make this choice, and whether by so doing
they have improved or have handicapped the administration of tort
law. Does the new thesis mark a return to some forgotten tradition?
Does it come as a belated response to some underlying dictate of the
Civil Code which heretofore has been neglected? Does it emerge as
the inevitable conclusion at which a reasonable court must arrive
when the provisions of article 2317 are subjected to close examination? Or, instead, is the new approach to be justified simply because
it is believed to serve as a much needed expedient? Do the courts
feel that it offers a more, acceptable means of affording recognition
of the everchanging needs of our industrialized society? If this is the
case (and I suspect that it is), can it be anticipated that such an ap5. See, e.g., 2 H. MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, TRAIT9: TH9ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA
RESPONSIBILITt CIVILE D9LICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE nos. 1138-1328 (6th ed 1970);

Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Concept of Fault, 27 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1952);
Tunc, The Twentieth Century Development and Function of the Law of Torts in
France. 14 INTL & CoMP. L.Q. 1089 (1965); Tune, Louisiana Tort Law at the Crossroads, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1111 (1974); Comment, Fault of the Victim: The Limits of
Liability under Civil Code Articles 2317, 2318 and 2321, 38 LA. L. REv. 995 (1978). See
also Verlander, Article 2317 Liability: An Analysis of Louisiana Jurisprudence Since
Loescher v. Parr,25 Loy. L. REV. 263 (1979); Comment, Does Louisiana Really Have
Strict Liability under Civil Code Articles 2317, 2318, 2321?, 40 LA. L. REV. 207 (1979);
Comment, Tort Law in Louisiana--The Supplementary Tort Articles 2317-2322, 44
TUL. L. REV. 119 (1969); Note, A FunctionalPurposefor Comparing Faults: A Suggestion for Reexamining "StrictLiability," 41 LA. L. REV. 1374 (1981); Note, Olsen v. Shell
Oik Expanded Liability for Offshore Oil Platform Owners, 40 LA. L. REV. 233 (1979);
Note, The "Discovery" of Article 2317, 37 LA. L. REV. 234 (1976).
6. Excellent critical treatments will be found in the writings of Professor Tunc
cited in note 5, supra, as well as in Tunc, Fault: A Common Name for Different
Misdeeds, 49 TUL. L. REV. 279 (1975). See also Starck, The Foundation of Delictual
Liability in Contemporary French Law: An Evaluation and a Proposal, 48 TUL. L.
REV. 1043 (1974).
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proach (with its heavy stress on the sheerly mechanical means
whereby the harm was inflicted) is a pragmatic procedure that is to
be commended for courtroom use? Is it a good administrative
tool-one that is calculated to attain the desired social result with
the greatest possible fluency and at a minimum of confusion, friction
and waste within the judicial process? Or does it merely clutter up
the decisional machinery by interjecting a host of irrelevant and inconsistent issues? These are the questions that bother me and which
I hope may be of interest to the reader.
Preliminary to our discussion of the French article 1384' and its
Louisiana counterpart, article 2317, we may well bear in mind that
under the literal language of both articles the "thing" for whose acts
the custodian is made responsible appears as a term that is not
qualified in any way. There is no mention of "dangerous" thing or
"defective" thing or a thing that is "negligently" made or kept or
handled by its custodian. Accordingly, the French courts have
chosen to accept "thing" as a comprehensive term without any
qualification whatsoever,' and the only remaining requirement in
France is that the act of the thing serve as the cause of the damage.
When this has been shown a presumption of liability follows. The only
available means by which the defendant in France can exonerate
himself is to persuade the trier that the injury was caused, not by
the act of the thing, but rather by the act of the victim himself or
the act of a third person. Hence the determination of liability under
French Civil Code article 1384 becomes resolved wholly into a matter of establishing causation, rather than "fault" or blameworthiness
on the part of the defendant.
The interpretation to be accorded the corresponding provision
(article 2317) in Louisiana is not clear. The leading case, Loescher v.
Parr, contains several expressions which cannot be readily reconciled. The opinion consistently speaks throughout of liability only for
"defective" things. The following observation is especially significant: [Tlhe injured person must "prove" the vice (i.e., an
unreasonable risk of injury to another) in the thing whose act causes
the damage, and that the damage results from the vice.

7. French Civil Code article 1384 provides:
A person is responsible not only for the damage which he causes owing to his own
act, but also for that which is caused by the acts of persons for whom he is
answerable or by things which are in his custody.
8. See 2 H. MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, supra note 5, at no. 1209; Tunc, supra note 7,
14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. at 1095.
9. 324 So. 2d at 446.
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This excerpt indicates that the court does not recognize liability
indiscriminately for the acts of all things, but only for those things
that are defective. Further, we are to gather that the thing is not
defective unless it contains a vice. A vice, in turn, appears to be
characterized as a quality that in some way exposes another to an
"unreasonable risk."
We learn, however, from the same opinion that this cannot be
precisely what the court meant. The opinion continues with'the
observation that the person legally responsible for the supervision,
care or guardianship may be held liable
[diespite the fact that no personal negligent act or inattention...
is proved ....

[Tihe fault of the person thus liable is based upon

his failure to prevent the "thing" for which he is responsible
from causing such reasonable risk of injury to others ...

I propose to defer discussion of this apparent inconsistency within
the Louisiana approach. It is mentioned here only to alert the
reader to the fact that in one vital respect the French and the Louisiana provisions have not received identical treatment. The fact remains, however, that they share a common feature in that both purport to recognize a distinction between the treatment to be accorded
liability arising out of "faulty" human conduct, on the one hand, and
liability based upon an "act" of a thing, (or, as in Louisiana, a "defective" thing) on the other hand.
In seeking to uncover some rational basis in support of the newly recognized liability, we propose the question as to why a special
provision for the act of things should have been added as a separate
article of the French Civil Code if liability for things was indeed
already comprehended under the earlier "fault" article. Should we
conclude that a contradiction or qualification of some kind was intended by the addition? The answer, I believe, lies with history. At
the time when the French Civil Code was contemplated there probably was no clear distinction in the minds of the redactors between
fault and no-fault. Most harms with which they were familiar were intentional, and those that were merely inadvertent were usually occasioned within a simple rural or domestic setting. The draftsmen, of
course, had no familiarity with the dangers of an industrialized
mechanized society such as prevails today." The principles that
came to be expessed in the Code were very likely reflections of an
10.
11.

Id.
See F.

LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW

45 (Oxford Press, 1950).
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effort to adjust Roman and ecclesiastic materials at hand, to reconcile these with existing customary law and to obviate discrepancies.
One progenitor of modern delictual law was the Lex Aquilia. Under
the Lex a distinction was recognized between the direct Aquilian
action for damages done corpore corpori, on the one hand, and the
Actio in Factum, on the other. The former contemplated a direct application of force by one person to another (similar to the Trespass
of the common law), while the Actio in Factum was a proceeding for
damages inflicted indirectly (as in the familiar Trespass on the
Case). Lawson observes that it has always been accepted doctrine
Law gave an action for omissions only in exceptional
that Roman
2
cases.1
By the time the Civil Code was in contemplation such distinctions as these had ceased to be acceptable. Instead, a single principle of liability based on fault had come into recognition as a controlling feature. This, we are told, was probably a reflection of the
Natural Law thinking prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Prominent natural law jurists in the Age of Reason had
pointed out that fault is to be discovered equally in both acts and
omissions.5 Accordingly, it was not unexpected that the redactors
would be at pains to make clear that a person is chargeable with
fault whenever he neglects to care for a thing, just as he is
chargeable with'fault when he applies force to the person or the
possession of another. Thus it was expectable that technical distinctions, such as those of the Lex Aquilia, should be avoided. Article
1384 (and its offspring article 2317 of the Louisiana Civil Code) may
be readily explained as provisions designed to assure that the fault
principle should be regarded as universal in its operation without
regard to the means or agency employed." Certainly there can be no
doubt that for nearly a century after the adoption of the Civil Code
it did not occur either to courts or writers that liability "par les
faits ...des choses que l'on a sous sa garde" might be accepted in
its literal sense in recognition that fault was a matter to be ignored
whenever suit was based on the guardianship of a thing."2
12. Id.at 26.
13. Fault creates the obligation to make good the loss .... By a wrong we here
mean every fault, whether by commission or omission, which is in conflict with
what men ought to do.
H. GROTIus, DE IURE BELLI AC PACiS, bk. II, c. XVII, sec. I.
14. See, e.g., P. FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PRItPARATOIRES DU CODE
CIVIL 478, 487-90 (1836) (discussion by Torrible).
15. See F. LAWSON, supra note 11; 2 H. MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, supra note 5. at no.
1140; Starck. supra note 6, at 1044. The Court de Cassation flatly rejected the no-fault
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It was not until 1896 that the Court of Cassation ventured an
observation that the explosion of an unattended boiler that resulted
in the death of a worker had the effect of creating under article 1384 a
presumption of liability for the act of the thing, irrespective of a
conceded shortcoming in the proof of fault."8 The best explanation of
this decision is the fact that it involved an injury to an industrial
worker. Several years before the decision was handed down the
neighboring Germans had adopted the first workmen's compensation
act in history, and at the very moment the boiler case was under
consideration the English were favorably debating a similar statute
which was adopted the following year. It is fairly to be expected
that the French court should be inclined similarly to protect the
French worker from the dangers of industial machinery by interpreting this article of the French Civil Code so as to produce a
result similar to that which would have been reached under the
compensation acts in neighboring countries. The very next year
witnessed the adoption of the French Workmen's Compensation Act,
and many of the more conservative French scholars entertained the
hope that the e~ploding boiler case would be regarded as an anomaly that attested the need for a compensation statute, and would now
promptly be forgotten.17 Indeed, the matter lay virtually dormant
until the onset of traffic accidents that followed in the wake of the
advent of the motor vehicle a quarter century later. 8
It is significant that in France the new liability for the acts of
things came to be recognized first in litigation arising out of industrial and transportation accidents. It is a widely recognized fact
that the conception of negligence was nurtured in the soil of
dangerous enterprise during the latter half of the ninteenth century.'
Negligence came as a judicial response to a need to reconcile the
conflict between the interest in safety of life and property, as opposed to the pressing interest in freedom of action in a young industrial society that was becoming increasingly dependent on faccontention in 1870, and denied recovery for an injury inflicted by the unexplained explosion of a boiler. Painvain c. Deschamps, S.1871.I.9.
16. Guissez, Cousin et Oriolle c. Veuve Teffaine, D.1897.1.433.
17. An interesting account of the course of the French decisions during this
period is found in Dak, Automobile Accidents: A Comparative Study of the Law of
Liability in Europe, 79 U. PA. L. REV; 271, 276-80 (1931). See also Malone, Damage
Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's Compensation, 12 LA. L. REV. 231,
241 (1952).
18. The cause celebre was Jand'heur c. Les Galeries Belfortaises, D.1930.129,
D.1930.I.57. See Malone, supra note 17, at 243-44.
19. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law
of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1, 24-31 (1970).
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tories and transporation. With these two interests in conflict the
idea of negligence emerged as an inviting compromise: Let the
enterpriser do all that he can to avoid a mishap (that is, behave as a
reasonably prudent individual) and if an accident nevertheless occurs, it will be regarded as unavoidable. Thus both the term "fault"
in France and "negligence" in the Anglo-American world are
abstractions that have little strictly moral content. They are devices
that perform their function as mirrors whose mission is to reflect
the ever-changing pattern of civilization in conflict.
For a while the claims in furtherance of industrial freedom of action gained the upper hand in the balance. But, by the turn of the
century the social and economic equation began shifting. Enterprise
was thriving. At the same time it was becoming increasingly
dangerous, and the cost in terms of human safety was becoming intolerable. Furthermore, a new economic institution, liability insurance, emerged as an effective means of absorbing the immediate
impact of accident costs and distributing such costs in dilution
among all those who benefit from a given enterprise and its
dangers. Also, various new means of minimizing accidents were
under continuous development, and judges came to feel the need to
make certain that these modern methods and devices were put into
effective operation by industry. In short, courts became increasingly
cognizant of the demand that enterprise be made more responsive to
the public for the growing aggregate of harms it was creating. The
face of the fault concept was undergoing significant renovation.
Still another feature of accident litigation came to be recognized
and demanded reform. This was an obvious inequality that prevailed
between the predicaments of the plaintiff and defendant respectively. This inequality appeared under two separate aspects: First there
is frequently noticeable an absence of mutuality of the exposure to
risk that obtains between the parties involved in an accident. An
outstanding example is the ordinary pedestrain injury. Here the
operation of a motor vehicle imposes a serious threat to the safety
of any pedestrian, while, conversely, the presence of the pedestrian
serves in no way to endanger the safety of the operator of the car.
A similar inequality obtains in the case of the helpless homeowner
whose premises may be rendered wholly unusable by reason of
smoke, glare or noise emitted by some neighboring industry. Where,
as in such instances, the risk is clearly one-sided, the notion of
negligence loses much of its essential appeal as an instrument of fair
play, and the plight of the helpless victim elicits the greater sympathy of the court.
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A second and different kind of inequality prevails with reference
to the procedural disadvantage under which the tort victim frequently suffers in the courtroom because of the fault system. So
long as both parties to a mishap are so situated that they have equal
access to the facts upon which liability must depend the-trial procedure appears fair enough. One's sense of justice is not offended by
the fact that the victim who is in court seeking to saddle the defendant with the cost of his accident is obliged by law to come forward
with proof and to establish affirmatively that the defendant was to
blame. The picture, however, assumes a different aspect when the
agency through which the injury was brought about is some complicated piece of machinery within the exclusive control of the defendant or where it is some thing of which the defendant has superior
knowledge and control because he was its maker, supplier or exclusive possessor, while the endangered person neither knows nor
has adequate means of knowing the nature of the defect or how it
might have been remedied. The usual burden of proof with which
the plaintiff is encumbered frequently proves fatal to his claim and
our sense of injustice is accordingly aroused. Negligence when
strictly administered tends to lose favor.
Despite these weaknesses in the fault structure a wise court
would hesitate to discard the tist of blameworthiness unless
something could be discovered better suited to the needs of society.
Any shift away from fault must be so tempered as not to ignore the
human reactions 9 f the man of the street when faced with litigation. In our everyday thinking, we are thoroughly accustomed to
cast responsibility upon whichever person was "to blame" for a
mishap, and, conversely, we are at pains to relieve the innocent.
Such reactions are a cherished part of our sense of fair play and we
expect to find the same philosophy in the courtroom. We remain
confident that we can distinguish right from wrong in simple terms,
and this sentiment is not one that can be left out of account in the
courtroom.' Hence unevenness of decision is inevitable so long as the
climate prevailing is that of conflict within our thinking. The need to
respond to our conventional urging is as strong as our yearning for
reform. Law must devise language that in some way will tend to accommodate both impulses.
Another complicating feature that must be taken into account is
a marked change in the popular attitude toward the feasibility of
spreading accident costs through the medium of liability insurance.
Until recently many courts appeared to welcome the expedient of
shifting liability onto the shoulders of whatever person is best
situated to pass the accident cost along so that it would ultimately
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be absorbed in dilution throughout the public in the form of modestly
increased costs. The fountain of wealth that could be made available
through insurance must have appeared luxuriant at first. But as
time has gone on and the harsh effects of inflation are being increasingly felt, the once lush fund provided by insurance premiums is
now in constant need of repletion. Its limits are being continuously
tested by an ever increasing flood of generous awards. The motoring
public has begun to feel the pinch, and the clamor for rate relief
must be clearly audible in the courtroom.
For similar reasons of expense the medical profession is impelled
to resort to defensive medical practices as a counter to the everincreasing wave of exhausting malpractice claims. One result here is
that the public discovers with dismay that it is subjected to batteries
of expensive medical tests and referrals to specialists, much of
which would probably be unnecessary under less frenetic conditions.sa
On an even broader base, the increased price of automobiles, drugs
and other commodities reflects the enlarged numbers and increased
quantum of products liability judgments.
Finally, it is well to consider that the ordinary award of
damages through tort litigation is only. one of several means for
shifting the brunt of accident costs off the shoulders of the victim.
Social security, workmen's compensation and group insurance afford
increasingly available resorts for financial relief against accident
costs. The picture is dramatically broadening in scale with respect
to motor vehicle compensation. We find legislatures giving serious
consideration to innovative schemes under which the now familiar
suit for full damages is being largely replaced by a statutory procedure that ignores fault put prescribes modest compensation to
cover only medical costs and lost earnings.? Generous awards in the
courtroom for pain and suffering are destined for substantial reduction at the hands of the legislatures.
The above observations are offered here solely as reminders
that the social and economic demands on tort law today are in a
19a.

Legislatures are becoming increasingly alert to this problem. One interesting

illustration is LA. R. S. 40:1299.41-42 (1975 & Supp. 1981).
20. The literature on the various no-fault proposals is profuse.

Highly recommended is R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). A group of more than twenty
factual studies were made by the United States Department of Transportation in 1970.
The report is compressed in Bombaugh, The Department.of Transportation'sAuto Insurance Study and Auto Accident Compensation Reform, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 207 (1971).
An excellent evaluative summary of the legislative picture appears in Nok, No-Fault
Automobile Insurance: An Evaluative Survey, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 909, 910-90 (1977).
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snarl, and a healthy solution cannot come through easy resort to
some attractive phrase. In light of the ever shifting background the
choice of doctrine available to courts should not be viewed outside
its proper perspective. The choice must be fairly in tune with the
range of other remedies available. The more often courts elect to
depart from the fault concept, the more sharply looms the obvious
similarity between the damage claim and other forms of social insurance. The need for some measure of conformity among remedies
is becoming increasingly evident.
We have observed that the concept of unrestricted liability for
the acts of things arose in France as the product of an effort by
courts to meet the need of a growing mechanized and traffic-laden
society, and the approach adopted should be judged in terms of how
well it can perform that function. The object is to serve a society
that is seeking to find its way while undergoing a sharp transition in
life style and in wealth and also with regard to the prevailing expectations of its members. In view of the fact that the atmosphere
within which tort law must operate today is characterized by persistent trial and retrial, it follows that any legal doctrine that ignores
the need to accommodate the prospect of continuous change will not
fare well. Words are the only tools of the law. When expressions
become arbitrary and extravagant they will be seized upon in the
future by later litigants and will be pressed to the breaking point.
All too frequently courts discover that they must temper or correct
some past overshot or dramatic leap by resorting in desperation to
tenuous distinctions drawn with respect to some inconsequential
trivia.
When the French version of the thesis of liability for the acts of
things is considered from a functional point of view its weaknesses
become apparent. First, there is to be noted a complete absence of
focus. The new thesis does not have as its domain any specific and
definable area whose peculiar needs can serve as a testing ground
for the merits and demerits of a novel approach. In this important
respect it is wholly unlike other "no fault" schemes, such as workers'
compensation and products liability. Consider, for example, workers'
compensation. This scheme was designed in an effort to provide a
solution for the specific problem of the risks that are characteristic
of employment, and it is geared so as to afford some limited
measure of compensation to the injured worker in light of the inequality of wealth that obtains between enterprise and those who
serve it. Hence we have a determinable objective to which the provisions of a compensation measure can be referred. The same is
true-although to a lesser extent-of products liability. Here, as in
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workers' compensation, is found a specific problem area. The need to
protect the safety of consumers and users comes frequently into conflict with the need of suppliers to avoid excessive costs and encumbrances in producing and merchandising their wares. Hence the
complex of rules that make up the law of products liability can be
referred readily to the prevailing conflict between consumer needs
and the need to facilitate production.
But how is it possible to isolate for separate treatment a group
of harms that can be distinguished from other harms solely by referring to the mechanical means that were employed to bring such
harms about? What moral, economic or social considerations are
brought into play in any undertaking to distinguish harms caused by
the act of things from harms brought about by acts of persons or
harms brought about in any other way? Such a distinction appears
to be entirely unrelated to any value scheme whatever.
We are confounded at the very outset when we attempt to
fathom what can be meant by the phrase, an act of a thing. Things
can be regarded as being either in existence or not in existence; but
they must be looked upon only as passive scenery until they are put
into motion by some person or by an extraneous force of some kind.
Although things can serve as instruments of some outside active
agency, it is difficult to regard them as being active participants
themselves in a human tragic happening. It is hard to discover any
reason of policy why the mere passive presence of an object at the
scene of injury should serve without more ado to saddle the innocent keeper of the object with legal responsibility. If simply "being
there" were indeed enough, the result would be universal liability of
bankrupting proportions. There would be no remaining field in
which the fault principle could operate, unless perchance a court
were faced with an injury arising from a struggle between nudists
in midair. Even then, as Ripert has suggested," the body might be
regarded as a thing under the control of the will. After consideration the French judges are in agreement that the thing must have
played an active, rather than a passive role in producing the harm.
But at this point there is a sharp disagreement to what is active and
what is passive. We can hardly avoid the conclusion that we are faced
with a purely mechanical distinction exceeding in its marvelous complexity even the long discarded artificialities that once obtained between Trespass and the Action on the Case. Such distinctions are not

21. Note by Ripert to Jand'heur c. Les Galeries Belfortaises. Cass. Liv., 21 Fev.
1927, D.1927.97.
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only specious: It appears that they bear no resemblance whatsoever
to any consideration of policy. 2
Once it is conceded that a given accident situation falls within
the province of article 1384 of the French Civil Code the defendant
has only one available avenue of escape. He cannot defeat the plaintiff's prima facie case by establishing that he was blameless in every
respect. He can save himself only by assuming the burden of showing affirmatively that the mishap was caused by the act of the victim, the act of a third party or the occurrence of a fortuitous event.
The unhappy result is that the outcome of the controversy is made
to depend upon an issue of causality-the most deceptive and
elusive concept known to tort law. 3
It is obvious that the extraneous "cause" thus brought into issue
by the defendant is not something which has the effect of precluding
the act of the thing from also serving as a factual cause of the injury; to give it such an effect would bring about a contradiction of
the very existence of the basic postulate underlying plaintiff's prima
facie claim under article 1384. If the act of the thing cannot be
regarded as a cause, the controversy passes outside the purview
of the article. Thence the conclusion is inescapable that when a
prima facie case has been established under article 1384 and a competing cause has then been asserted in defense, the existence of
liability must be recognized as dependent on a policy judgment
rather than a finding of fact. The court must decide which extraneous causes have the legal effect of eliminating the act of the
thing as a source of responsibility. Thus the French court finds itself
floundering in the same morass of proximate cause that has bedeviled courts on this side of the Atlantic for more than a century.
Indeed the predicament of the French courts in this respect is a
matter of more serious concern than proximate cause at common
law, for under the French approach the causation issue must support
unaided the entire burden of giving effect to all policy considerations that arise. There is no other vehicle such as fault or negligence
or duty to assist in affording the elbow room needed for
discriminate torts engineering. Professor Andre Tunc who, more
than perhaps anyone else, has explored the ramifications of cause
under article 1384 comments as follows on the three extraneous
causes the defendant can assert by way of defense:
These three factors discharged the custodian of the thing,
only to the extent to which they could neither have been fore22. See 2 H. MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, supra note 5, at no. 1211.4.
23.

See id at nos. 1526 to 1527.2
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seen nor avoided. As a matter of fact, our courts usually
discharge the custodian when he can give evidence that he, or
the person who was actually in control of the thing, has not committed any fault. Our law in this field remains largely based on
the concept of fault, with one important exception: the custodian
of the thing can be discharged only to the extent to which the
damage was caused by an external circumstance; if, on the other
hand, the damage is the result of a defect in the thing, he will
not be discharged, even though he could not have known of the
defect.2 '
The concluding part of the above observation is of special interest
for Louisiana in light of the position of the supreme court of this
state which would uniformly require a showing that the thing that
caused the injury was "defective." If the thing causing the harm is
"defective," the custodian remains liable in both jurisdictions supposedly despite his exercise of skill and care. If, however, the thing
is not "defective," the reasonableness of the defendant's behavior
can serve to preclude his liability in both France and Louisiana.
An important distinction still remains, however. In France the
plaintiff is able to establish his prima facie case merely by showing
a cause-in-fact relation between the act of the thing and the ensuing
harm. Establishing the existence of a defect or the absence thereof
is not essential under the French approach until after the defendant
undertakes to attribute the harm to some extraneous cause. Even
then it is obvious from Professor Tunc's observation that the fault
element operates only from ambush behind the facade of causation.
In Louisiana, on the other hand, it seems clear that the existence of
a vice (defect) in the thing is a matter to be demonstrated by the
victim as a part of his initial showing under article 2317.
THE LOUISIANA DOCTRINE

Following the French commitment in 1930 to liability for the
acts of things, almost a half century elapsed before the Louisiana
Supreme Court evidenced an interest in the corresponding article
2317 of this state's Civil Code. In nineteenth century Louisiana, even
more than in France, liability had been recognized entirely as a concomitant of fault." This was to be expected in a pioneer American
24.
25.

Tunc, supra note 5, 14 INTL & COMP. L.Q. at 1096.
A good illustration is Dupre v. Travelers Insurance Co.. 213 So. 2d 98 (La.

App. 1st Cir. 1968), noted in Note, Things in One's Custody-LouisianaCivil Code Article 2317. 43 TUL. L. REv. 907 (1969).
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community whose growth and prosperity has been attributed almost'
entirely to trains and heavy industrial development. Here in nineteenth century Louisiana, as in France, negligence was doing
yeoman's service as an agent to effect a compromise between the
needs of safety on the one hand and the needs of increasingly
dangerous enterprise on the other. Again, as in France, the Louisiana panorama of values began shifting gradually with the turn of
the century. The interest in safety and a healthy environment came
to be recognized as the uppermost need and the condition of inequali.
ty and lack of mutuality between the litigating parties, already
observed with respect to France, became increasingly apparent here.
Hence the courts of this state, like those in France, began to turn a
skeptical eye upon the traditional fault requirement, which may have
been so administered in the past as to unduly favor enterprise.
It is interesting to note that the three decisions which led even.
tually to the act-of-things doctrine were all controversies over oc..
curences typical of a rural nonmechanized society. The three offending objects were, in turn, a frisky dog,2 a child on a bicycle, and a
falling tree. In the case of the dog, the animal's playful instinct,
prompted it to bite a bystander who was attempting to rescue a
smaller dog annoyed by the animal in question. Had the injury been
inflicted by a person we would be tempted to call it inadvertent (certainly it was not the kind of behavior to be expected of a reasonably
prudent dog). In this connection, however, it may be noted that a
substantial number of courts have managed, without departing from
ordinary notions of negligence, to impose liability on the owners of
friendly dogs who may clumsily knock, down bystanders without
meaning to harm them." Similarly, successful suits by motorists
against the owners of automobile-chasing dogs are frequent.28 At any
rate one would be reluctant to conclude that any drastic renovation
of theory was necessary in order to prevent a palpable injustice in
this case. The same may be said concerning the six-year-old child
whose operation of a bicycle doubtless left much to be desired, causing him to strike and injure an elderly lady on the sidewalk."9 The
supreme court observed that the child was too young to be condemned as negligent, but it nevertheless imposed liability upon the
26. Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
27. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 76, at 501 nn. 96 & 97 (4th ed. 1971);
Note, Dog Owner's Liability in Non-bite Situations: Duty v. Cause-Barking up the
Wrong Tree,- 23 MIAMI U. L. REV. 848 (1969).

28. See authorities cited in note 27, supra.
29. See Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
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parents without reference to any fault on their part. This it did only
after a thorough reappraisal of article 2318 of the Civil Code. It appears doubtful that so drastic an attack on the problem was
necessary. Statements affirming an infant's lack of capacity to
behave negligently have made their appearance chiefly in cases involving accidents in which some child was struck by an adult
motorist who has sought to avoid liability- by insisting that the
child's own contributory negligence should operate as a defense. In
such situations courts everywhere have understandably shown
themselves ready to minimize any claim of wrongdoing by the child.
However, where it is the child itself that has inflicted the harm, and
particularly where it has done so by engaging in some activity normally reserved for more mature persons, such as driving a motor
vehicle or (as in one case) playing golf on a public course, the courts
.have shown a less solicitous regard for the youth of the offender."
There is nothing in the instant case to suggest that the parents
were unaware of their child's operation of the bicycle on a public
sidewalk. It can be noted that both cases share common features
-that anticipate liability for an act-of-things doctrine: In each instance
there was an injury caused by something other than the act of a
responsible person. In the one case the actor was an animal, and in
the other, an infant. Second, in each instance the offending agency
was under the control (garde) of the defendant, and, finally in each
instance the guardian was found to be blameless.
However, in neither of the two controversies discussed above
does there appear any general observation confirming the existence
of a special liability for acts of things. Instead, the reference in each
instance was to some specific code provision that governed the controversy (article 2321, dealing with the liability of a keeper of
animals and article 2318 concerning the liability of parents). In each
instance the showing made by the plaintiff was flawed by some
shortcoming that forestalled his right to recover under previously
accepted interpretations of the specific articles on which he relied.
As noted earlier, the Louisiana cause celebre that ushered in
the doctrine of unqualified liability for the acts of defective things is
Loescher v. Parr.' The facts are uncomplicated: A tree standing in
the yard of the defendant's urban residence fell onto the plaintiff's
30.

Children often are liable for injuries inflicted by their operation of motor

scooters; liability usually does not attach for their operation of bicycles. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 27, at § 32, at 157. Cases in other jurisdictions are limited to the delict by
the child himself, since vicarious parental liability is not recognized outside Louisiana.
31. 324 So. 2d 442 (La. 1975).
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car parked in a neighboring lot and demolished it. The tree was 90
percent rotten. The immediate force that brought it down was a
wind which "although high and gusty was not so abnormal as to be
unforeseeable.""2 No mention is made as to why the situation would
not be entirely appropriate for recovery under res ipsa loquitur.
The lengthy and thoughful opinion of Justice Tate suggests that
the author already had been attracted by what he regarded as the
advantages of unqualified liability. In several earlier decisions he
had warmly espoused strict liability in traffic accidents attributable
to defective equipment.' It is not surprising that Loescher, with its
rotten tree which superficially appeared safe, should have suggested
to Justice Tate that here was an ideal opportunity to put his
thoughts to the test. Indeed, the facts of Loescher were so disarming for Tate's purpose that the many complications that inhere in
his thesis of liability for the acts of defective things were obscured.
For instance, in Loescher there was no need to ponder the problem
as to what should be regarded as a defect. The almost entirely rotten state of the tree afforded a convincing and dramatic illustration.
Equally at hand was an answer to the question, what is an act of a
thing? The tree obligingly accommodated this requirement by falling
down upon the neighbor's car without human intervention. Finally,
the attraction afforded by Tate's proposal to dispense with the fault
requirement was heightened when presented in the company of
facts that almost screamed of negligence on the part of the tree
owner. I feel that most readers when they have become acquainted
with the facts would readily agree that Parr should be made to pay
under any view of the matter. As a result, the edge of any temptation to deal critically with Tate's thesis becomes somewhat dulled.
At the outset of our discussion we emphasized that doubts advanced against the soundness of the French position under article
1384 should be substantially moderated when directed toward the
newly emerged Louisiana doctrine. This is so, we noted, because of
the unique requirement stressed in Loescher that the injurious
thing must be shown by the victim to be defective. Hence "defective
thing" is a term of paramount importance which must be explored.
We may begin by exploring for possible sources from which tile
idea of defect may have been derived. Does "defect" express some
basic notion that is implicit in the Civil Code? Is it a description
32. Id. at 449.

33. See, e.g., Justice Tate's special concurring opinion in Cartwright v. Firemen's
Insurance Co., 213 So. 2d 154, 156.58 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
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whose meaning must be determined in the interest of preserving
doctrinal unity? Or, on the other hand, does it owe its justification
to some practical need of legal engineering? Is its purpose to serve
in part at least as-a substitute for some other concept such as fault
or negligence? If so, what purpose is served by the replacement?
Again, in what areas of accident law is the term "defective thing"
intended to operate, and to what point in a legal dispute does it play
the dominant role? The inquiries that spring from such uncertainties
are many and perplexing.
A search for some underlying jurisprudential support for the
"defect" requirement within the pattern or arrangment of the
various code articles on Delicts affords little comfort. Not much is
gained if we attempt to discover any analogy to those provisions we
have previously considered dealing with the tort liability of parents
or the owners of animals."4 Paradoxically, the troublesome feature
the Louisiana courts were obliged to face with reference to the instances of the young bicyclist and the friendly tempered dog was
the difficulty of discovering any defect that could be attributed to
either offender.' s
Article 2322, in the same chapter, subjects the owner of a
building to liability for the damage occasioned by its ruin "when this
is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice in
its original construction.""N Similarly, article 670 requires the owner
to keep his buildings in repair so that neither their fall nor that of
any part of the material composing them may injure the neighbors
or passersby. Both these articles have been regarded by the Louisiana courts as imposing absolute liability within their special fields
of operation. But like many other provisions for specific
catastrophes with which lawyers everywhere have long been
familiar, they are of ancient origin. A mention of harms inflicted by
falling buildings was found in the Code of Hammurabi and in the
Roman Institution of Cautio Damni Infecti. They far antedate any
distinctions drawn by lawyers between fault and no-fault liability.
They look backward toward the dawn of history and certainly can-

34.

See notes 26-29, supra, and accompanying text.

35. Id.
36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2322 (emphasis supplied). The text of article 2322 provides:
The owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin,
when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice in its

original construction.
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not be thought of realistically as harbingers of a radical shift .in tort
ideas yet to come.3"
The Loescher opinion calls attention to the interpretation accorded by the courts of Belgium to article 1384 of the Belgian Civil
Code. The accepted interpretation in that jurisdiction is in accord
with the Louisiana position requiring that a defect must be
established by the victim. 8 This Belgian development began as late
as 1904,," and it has elicited considerable discussion. Of the Belgian
scholars, M. De Page, 0 MM. Pirson and De Ville'" and M. Van Ryn 2
have each arrived at a different version with respect to the essential nature of a "defect." Professor Dalcq observes that in reality the
meaning must be regarded as in a continuing process of evolution as
the jurisprudence progresses. 3 It appears appropriate to regard the
Belgian position as a modern innovation which parallels the change
in Louisiana, rather than as a source from which our position was
derived. Even a casual review of the Belgian decisions and literature
indicates that judges and writers in that country are experiencing
difficulties very similar to those discussed in the following. pages
dealing with the Louisiana situation.
One common use of the word "defective" is the frequent
reference in products liability decisions to "defective product." The
responsibility imposed by modern law on makers or sellers for harm
'resulting from the use of a "defective" product is commonly regarded
as a no-fault type liability. Indeed the similarity between the term
"defect" under article 2317 and "defective product" under products
liability law may suggest on first impression that whatever administrative advantage can be gained by employing the term "defective product" in products liability disputes might be equally ex37. Under archaic law the principal object was to reach the offending thing itself
and to secure its deliverance over to the victim so that he could wreak his vengenance
on it. Animals and even inanimate objects which had harmed persons were attainted
and had to be abandoned by their owners. See Malone, supra note 19, at 4. The claim
under article 2322 for damage due to the ruin of a building apparently was an outgrowth from the noxal surrender of Roman law. 1 R. DALCQ, TRAITE DE LA RESPONSABILITI CIVILE no. 2014 (1959).

38. R. DALCQ, supra note 37, at no. 2138.
39. Id no. 2028.
40. II DEPAGE, TRAITS, COMPLE MENT, no. 1007, noted in R. DALCQ, supra note 37,
at no. 2140.
41. I PIRSON ET DE VILLIt, TRAITa no. 137, noted in R. DALCQ, supra note 37, at no.
2141.

42. VAN RYN, LA RESPONSIBILIT9 DU FAIT DES CHOSES 164 (1946), noted in R.
DALCQj supra note 37, at no. 2142.
43. R. DALCQ, supra note 37, at nos. 2144-2146.
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pected to flow from a use of the term "defective thing" in controversies under article 2317 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
The similarity of wording shared by the two terms, however,
could not justify a conclusion that they perform functions that are
similarly useful when placed at work in the resolution of controversies. This may be better understood when we consider the wide
range of matters with which the court may be obliged to deal in article 2317 controversies when compared with the restricted range of
contests leading to products liability suits. The term "defective product" is still understood only imperfectly and is mistrusted by many
judges and writers." Nevertheless,' the standards by which the
defectiveness of a product is determined are standards that can be
brought into fair focus by a consideration of acceptable practices
prevailing among makers and merchants. These practices, in turn,
can be appraised as being adequate or inadequate by referring to
the needs of the marketplace. Whatever possibilities for produce improvement may exist can be explored in the courtroom with fair success. Hence, the phrase "defective product" tends to acquire a
graspable meaning through its repeated use in lawsuits between
two classes of litigants: commercial producers, on the one hand, and
consumers, on the other. Defectiveness of a product is frequently
defined as a failure to meet reasonable consumer expectations.",
By contrast, the wide variety of subject matter presented for
litigation in situations in which the term, defective thing, becomes
controlling is an area virtually without any boundary whatever. For
example, on one occasion a judge may be called upon to assign a
meaning to "defect" when there is at issue the decayed condition of
a fallen tree." Thereafter the same problem may arise in a setting
where the dispute is centered on the failure of a parking lot
operator to provide adequate lighting. 7 Again, the judge may be
called on to decide whether the term "defect" includes a board that
was so positioned across the rafters of a barn that it could not be
used as a footway with full safety,"8 or whether human blood provided by a hospital for transfusion should be branded as defective in
44.

See D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 8 (West, 2d ed

1981).
45.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965).
46. See Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
47. See Sullivan v. Gulf States Util. Co., 382 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ

denied, 384 So. 2d 447 (La. 1980).
48. See Fonseca v. Marlin Marine Corp., 385 So. 2d 341 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ
granted, 392 So. 2d 666 (La. 1980).
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the event that hepatitis develops from its use.' 9 It is apparent that
whatever policy considerations are brought into play in any one instance litigated under article 2317 will probably bear no
resemblance to considerations appropriate for the disposition of any
other litigated instance. Hence a continuous progression of litigation
may serve only to heighten the confusion that surrounds the term.
The wide variety of litigated situations that must be crowded
under the umbrage of the term, defective thing, has been stressed
here only to suggest the complications certain to arise whenever a
wide variety of conflicts must be referred indiscriminately to a
single term that is as obscure and out of focus as "defective thing."
The trouble lies with the phrase, which has no discernible content of
its own and which must acquire its meaning solely from the environment attendant on each of the variety of disputes in which it is put
to use.
By way of contrast we should note that there are other expressions which are endowed with great fluidity of meaning and which
readily lend themselves to effective use in a wide variety of controversies. Negligence is a ready example: It serves as a good working term in disputes arising from such varied mishaps as automobile
accidents, falling structures, miscarriages of medical, legal or architectural practices, et cetera. This success must be attributed to its
facility as a tool which is flexible while at the same time tending to
channel the creative instinct of the judge. It calls upon him to
balance a wide range of moral, social and economic values, and to
formulate a judgment dictated by that balance. Negligence does not
itself perform the function of balancing and judging, but it does
serve to suggest the path that he should follow. The true value of the
negligence conception is twofold: First, it functions as a constant
reminder to the trier that the balancing function must prevail as the
controlling feature of the judging operation. The conception of
negligence does this by obliging him to think in terms of
"reasonable" versus "unreasonable" conduct or risk.
The second value in the use of negligence arises from the opportunity it affords the judge to avail himself of a wide assortment of
auxiliary aids for his decision. These may take the form of corollary
rules or procedural devices that control the mechanics needed for
the conduct of the operation. Other auxiliaries are perhaps best
thought of as the accepted reaction patterns made available for the
judge's guidance. They are the attitudes and tendencies of feeling
49.

Debattista v. Argonaut Ins., 393 So. 2d 728 (La. 1981).
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which exert a powerful influence upon his thinking. But, whatever
form these auxiliaries may assume, they are vital parts of the judging process-parts that have become integrated into it by accretion
after a century of intensive judicial use and reuse. Repeated experience in dealing with negligence so sensitizes the judge that he
acquires an instinctive familiarity with many rudimentary assumptions that underlie every balancing operation. These assumptions
are so deeply imbedded within the professional personality of the
judge that they exert their influence largely below the language
level.
They may be referred to by him casually as mere matters of
*6common sense." But their persuasive force is no way diminished for
that reason. Just one example: Whenever the consequence to be anticipated from a mishap is viewed by the trier as a matter of serious
concern, the chance that such consequence may turn into a reality
must be correspondingly reduced. Otherwise the chance cannot be
tolerated in law because it has become an unreasonable chance. A
host of other familiar postulates that have become second nature for
any experienced judge will readily occur to the reader."0 They all are
amalgam in the makeup of negligence. Hence the true nature of
negligence is best understood when it is viewed as an operating network of many varied components, all of which are dedicated to the
reconciliation of conflicting interests through the attainment. of a
balance.
If this broad and accommodating formula of negligence is to be
abandoned whenever the injury was inflicted through the act of a
thing, it becomes essential to determine what is meant by the adjective, "defective." A few definitions that might be advanced and be
dismissed at the outset: First, a thing is not to be condemned as
defective solely by reason of the fact that it gave rise to an injury
on the particular occasion in question. If the mere existence of a
causal relation between an act of the thing and the injury complained
of were regarded as sufficient to entail liability on the part of
the guardian, the result would be a return to the French position
under article 1384, which was criticized earlier," and the qualifying
term "defective" would be deprived entirely of all significance.
Again, we cannot classify a thing as defective merely because it
is of such a nature that it would tend to cause injury. The terms,
"dangerous" thing, and "defective" thing should not be regarded as
50. An excellent, compact treatment of the array of factors that must be considered in determining "unreasonableness" may be found at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 291-293 (1965).

51. See discussion in text at pp. 981, 988, supra.
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synonymous. Few are the objects that are wholly incapable of inflicting harm under appropriate circumstances. Pure water can produce
damage by fire if it is poured over sodium, and an infant can drown
in a shallow bathtub or cut itself with a pair of shears. At least we
are obliged to qualify the damaging tendency of the object in some
way. Is a reference to the apparent size of the tendency helpful at
this point? Can we conclude that a thing is defective if it involves
great danger, but not otherwise? The extent of the chance of danger
to which a thing may expose those in its vicinity would very likely
depend on the location where it is placed or the use to which it has
been put. These characteristics must be attributed to human
behavior which, in turn, must be appraised as foolish or
wise-reasonable or unreasonable. At this point it is hard to escape
the conclusion that the familiar conception of negligence (absence of
reasonable care) is lurking in the immediate background. At any
rate, there is little or no evidence that the degree or extent of the
danger inherent in an object itself, when considered alone, has had
any appreciable influence on the results reached in the Louisiana
decisions. The lethal voltage of an electric powerline did not have
the effect of making the line "defective,"5 and the same was true of
the motorcycle resting on a kickstand, which fell over upon a child."3
On the other hand, a small puddle of rainwater in a remote corner of
a skating rink prompted the court to regard the premises as defective." Also defective was a board which fell due to its position
across the rafters in the upper part of a barn where only rarely
would the presence of a person be expected."8
The opinion in Loescher affords one clue to the meaning of
"defective." We have already observed Justice Tate's statement
that a thing becomes defective when it is tainted with a "vice," and
is immediately characterized in the opinion as the presence of
"an unreasonable risk of injury to another."" Hence we gain the impression that the existence of defect is determined by reference to
some quality of human behavior that brought the risk about. The
term "unreasonable" bears the connotation of being unacceptable or
falling short of expectations. However, conduct that exposes the ac4"vice"

52. See Gessums v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 652 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1981).
53. See Carter v. Salter, 351 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 352 So. 2d
1045 (La. 1977).
54. See Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981).
55. See Fonseca v. Marlin Marine Corp., 385 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
granted, 392 So. 2d 666 (La. 1980).
56. See the quoted material in text at note 9, supra.
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tor or another to a sizeable chance of injury may nevertheless meet
with the full approval of society, and hence it remains reasonable."
Conversely, the taking of even a slight chance of inflicting a serious
harm may be entirely unreasonable because it was unnecessary or it
served no useful purpose." The terms "unreasonable," "faulty," and
"blameworthy" appear to be virtually indistinguishable in the minds
of most persons.
A review of the decisions rendered pursuant to article 2317
leaves the impression that in a substantial majority of the accidents
involved, liability for damages could have easily been imposed on a
negligence basis. Often this will be expressly noted in the opinion. 9
Conversely, where the facts strongly suggest that there was no
negligence on the part of the defendant, the court will very likely
conclude that the thing was not "defective.""
Although there remain cases in which recovery cannot readily
be identified with the presence of negligence," most such instances
represent situations that deserve special attention. Frequently the
situation in question falls just at or beyond the outer fringe of an
area in which access to recovery by way of negligence principles
could be recognized. Usually the plaintiff in these cases has succeeded
in pointing out that something within the exclusive control of the
defendant "went wrong"-that safety conditions were not as they
57.

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 291 & comment (d)(1965).

58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Morgan v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 402 So. 2d 640 (La. 1981)
(poor arrangement of a step in a church building); Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d
1285 (La. 1978) (exploding water heater); Foggan v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. & Dev.,
402 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (large hole in highway); Wilkinson y. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 400 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) (failure to use shatterproof glass in a school corridor) Sullivan v. Gulf States Util. Co., 382 So. 2d 184 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1980) (obstruction in parking lot).
60. See, e.g., Gessums v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 652 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1981)
(power line was properly situated); Usry v. Louisiana Dept. of Highways, 402 So. 2d
240 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981), writ denied, 406 So. 2d 613 (La. 1981) (guard rail on a
highway); Sanders v. Stutes, 400 So. 2d 1159 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (wet carpet in a
public place); Stewart v. Zurich Ins. Co., 342 So. 2d 1273 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (fall
from playground equipment); Vidrine v. Missouri Farm Ass'n, 339 So. 2d 877 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1976), writ denied, 342 So. 2d 216 (La. 1977) (slippery wet plank on a farm
path).
61. See, e.g., Fonseca v. Marlin Marine Corp., 385 So. 2d 341. This case is difficult
to approve. A repairman was injured when he attempted to walk over boards layed
over the rafters of a barn. He stepped on a board that failed to reach the rafter ahead
and sustained injury. The facts indicated that use of the barn attic was anticipated only
for occassional workers, who could be expected to realize that no preparation had been
made for their presence there.
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were intended-but the court is not satisfied that any specific default that could be charged against the defendant has been established
with convincing clarity. A few instances of this kind from the decisions are illustrative: A child's foot is caught in the narrow space between the side and the moving step of an escalator in a department
store. Ordinarily the mere occurrence of such an accident carries the
inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur. In the case at hand,
however, the proprietor is able to show that the national safety
standards for escalators would permit a one-eighth inch clearance at
this location, while the clearance in question was only one-sixteenth
inch. The trier's likely reaction here could be that if this kind of
thing nevertheless happens, the existing standards are not acceptable in so defining reasonable safety. But the availability of article
2317 makes such an observation unnecessary and offers the most attractive route to recovery. 2 Again suppose that the roof of a skating
rink is leaking; the proprietors have diligently-cleared one wet spot
on the floor, but another small leak develops which management has
not yet been able to discover. A patron slips on this spot and is injured, 3 Should the showing that there were strenuous efforts on the
part of management preclude a finding of negligence? Perhaps
management should have excluded child skaters while the roof was
leaking or perhaps they should provide a watertight roof for the
protection of their patrons. Is it not arguable that with respect to
places of this sort the standard of care necessary should be hoisted
up to top notch? This can be achieved through a manipulation of
negligence doctrine as well as through a resort to article 2317, while
at the same time retaining a broad latitude for individualized judgment in future decisions.
Perhaps the most striking instances of resort to the "defective
thing" approach involve injuries sustained by reason of defects in
public highways. Here is an area of litigation in which courts have
formerly curbed liability with a short leash. Until recnetly, recovery
against public bodies has proved difficult. The public defendants
either enjoyed complete immunity6' or if subject to suit they were
able to claim the benefit of special protective conditions. Among
62. See Marquez v. City Stores Co., 371 So. 2d 810 (La. 1979).
63. See, e.g., Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981) (court found a floor

defective).
64. It is interesting here to compare Prosser's view of public immunity in W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 125 (3d ed 1964), with his discussion of the more restrictive status of public immunity in the 1974 fourth edition at section 131. See also the introductory note to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 45A (1974).
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such protections was the classic requirement that knowledge (actual
or constructive) of a defect in a public way must be established by
anyone sustaining injury from such a defect." Thus the usual duty of
an affirmative reasonable inspection imposed on the shoulders of
other proprietors of premises thrown open to the public has been
toned down in favor of public bodies. But in recent years the path to
recovery against public bodies has been opening rapidly. Resort to
article 2317 in these cases can be appropriately viewed as another
evidence of a general expansion of public liability. The writer suggests that a commitment to an affirmative requirement of reasonable care in the maintenance of public highways would have led to a
recovery in most of the instances in which the drain, curb or paving
was branded as a "defective thing."
There remains a plausible version of the term "defective thing":
A thing might be regarded as defective whenever something went
wrong during the process of creating it. In such cases the thing did
not turn out to be as it was intended or it developed an unexpected
flaw. Perhaps faulty material was used or some process in the
course of fabrication fell short. Perhaps some harmful foreign
material or object found its way into the product, or perhaps a
necessary inspection was overlooked, with the result that dangerous
spoilage or deterioration set in. The essence of a defect as thus conceived is an inadvertence that brings about a departure from the intention of the maker or supplier of the thing or the guardian who is
charged with its maintenance. A defect, when so restricted in meaning, stands in contrast with other kinds of inadvertent injury which
should be attributed to some shortcoming in judgment on the part
of the defendant as he planned the object or selected the environment in which it should be used. The situation where something
went wrong is recognized readily. Under the circumstances it is not
necessary that the trier undertake to appraise the defendant's foresight or his good judgment. He need not determine what advance
measures could or should have been taken in order to adjust the
thing safely to its expected environment or its intended use. Nor
need he speculate concerning the anticipated cost or difficulty that
would be involved for the defendant in assuring a greater safety
than was in fact offered. When the error is one that occurred only
during the course of making, distributing or using an object that
had been conceived by the defendant with a due regard for safety,

65. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 982-83 (4th ed. 1974).
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the trier is spared most of the complexity involved in an effort to
arrive at a fair balance of the conflicting interests at stake. In such
cases the need to tailor the standard of care to the special needs of
the occasion is less exacting.
Whenever the controversy is one that falls within the boundaries suggested above, the theory of liability for defective things
can be viewed in its most favorable aspect. The duty of the defendant to avoid error in carrying out his intentions comes to be
treated under that theory as an unqualified duty, rather than merely a duty requiring reasonable care. By far the greater number of
accidents in which the Louisiana courts have resorted to article 2317
have involved only this variety of error." In most instances that
could not be so characterized the court has indicated that the existence of negligence had appeared to its satisfaction. 7
One is tempted to. doubt, however, whether resort to unqualified
liability is a sound approach even under the limited circumstances
set forth above. In favor of the new approach is the fact that the
controversies that arise whenever something "goes wrong" are likely to be controversies in which the victim is at a procedural disadvantage in his attempt to establish how the error occurred. The
absence of mutuality mentioned earlier"8 is likely to obtain here, and
the defendant is usually in a better position than the victim to account for what went wrong and why it did so. If a bottle explodes, if
brakes fail to hold or there is a collapse at a welded joint, or if a
dead mouse appears in a soft drink, the victim should not be obliged
to explain the occurrence in such a way as to point the finger of responsibility toward the defendant. The impulse to come to the victim's assistance under such circumstances probably accounts for the
66. The leading case of Loeacher v. Parr,involving the fall of a decayed tree, is of
this type. See also Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978) (defective valve in
a water heater); Jones v. City of Baton Rough-Parish of East Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d
737 (La. 1980) (broken top to a catch basin in a street); Foggan v. Louisiana Dept. of
Transp. & Dev., 402 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (large hole in a highway);
Leaber v. Jolley Elevator Co., 354 So. 2d 746 (La. App. 4th Cir.), wirts refused, 356 So.
2d 1004, 1010 (La. 1978) (hydraulic elevator developed slippage).
67. See, e.g., Morgan v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 402 So. 2d 640 (La. 1981)
(a stepdown in a church building was in violation of a city building code; confusion of
colors surrounding the step increased the chance of someone falling down step);
Sullivan v. Gulf States Util. Co., 382 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (a concrete pier
in a parking lot was treated as defective because the defendant had not undertaken to
provide sufficient lighting, nor was adequate warning given of the presence of the
pier).
68. See text at p. 985, supra.
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position prevailing in many jurisdictions that whenever res ipsa loquitur applies, the burden of explanation shifts to the defendant."0 Other
courts, without abandoning the negligence concepts, venture to
affirm that whenever the plaintiff has shown that the accident is attributed to some cause such as defective brakes or a rupture of a
welded spot in the structure of a vehicle, it then becomes encumbent on the defendant to establish that he was utterly without fault
or that the condition could not be avoided through the exercise of
even the highest degree of care."0 Although it must be conceded that
these are departures from traditional negligence procedure, they are
nevertheless familiar and they leave the negligence concept intact.
The writer suggests that the wide range of situations to which the
negligence network can be adjusted serves to recommend it as the
most suitable approach for this group of situations.
A court would encounter serious difficulties if it should attempt,
as suggested, to restrict the no-fault approach so as to limit its application to those cases where something "went wrong" in carrying
out the defendant's undertaking while at the same time it retains
the traditional negligence attack for other "acts of things." Accidental happenings do not readily submit to any such classification. The
kind of difficulties that would face the court can be illustrated by a
commonplace situation where the plaintiff, a patron of the defendant's parking lot, runs into an object that is obscured by inadequate lighting and is injured.' If the shortage of illumination should
be attributed to a defective electric transformer or a bulb that
"went bad," the accident. would fall neatly within the classification
suggested above for no-fault treatment of harms through defective
things. But the same would not be true if the shortage of light must
be blamed on a failure by the defendant to supply sufficient lamps
or to turn them on at the proper time, or his neglect to select bulbs
of adequate wattage for the need at hand. Here the reasonableness
of the defendant's judgment would necessarily come under attack,
69. See Lykiardopoulo v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., Light & Power Co., 127
La. 309, 53 So. 575 (1910). For other cases reaching the same conclusion, see Malone,
Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4 LA.

L. REv. 70, 89 & n.48 (1941).
70. See Simon v. Ford Motor Co., 282 So. 2d 126, 133 (La. 1973) (Tate, J., on
rehearing). The best illustration of this treatment is Samaha v. Southern Rambler
Sales, Inc., 146 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). The case concerned the tort liability
of a car manufacturer for a defective weld which caused a collision in which the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff had purchased the vehicle from the defendant Souther
Rambler. See also Rizley v. Cutrer, 232 La. 655, 663, 95 So. 2d 139, 142 (1957).
71. The illustration is suggested by the facts in Sullivan v. Gulf States UtiL Co.,
382 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 384 So. 2d 447 (La. 1980).
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and hence under the arrangement suggested the appropriate approach would be through the issue of negligence. Or again, suppose
that in the past the parking lot owner had experienced frequent
unavoidable failures of transformers or bulbs, and yet he had failed
to provide alert attendants with adequate replacements? There will
doubtless occur to the reader's mind numerous instances such as
these where the attack to be selected must depend upon the trier's
conclusion with respect to the specific cause of the mishap. Hence,
although there is much to commend the distinction suggested above,
its advantages may be more than offset by awkwardness in its attempted administration.
The conclusion appears inescapable that no-fault liability for the
acts of "defective" things offers no demonstrable advantage over
the familiar negligence approach, excepting the possibility of some
slight gain in preserving a procedural balance for the litigating parties. Even here, I suggest that whatever advantage may be realized
through resort to a no-fault attack could be realized equally well
through a liberalized administration of the prerequisites for making
out a prima facie case of negligence. The advantages of adhering consistently to the negligence attack appear to this writer to be overwhelming. By so proceeding the court is enabled to refer each controversy to one single broad inquiry: Is the game worth the candle?
By contrast, any attempt to adopt one approach when the harm was
caused by an allegedly defective thing and another quite different
approach when the harm was caused by a person (an unreasonable
man) serves only to introduce a complicating element that is difficult
to justify. Especially is this true when, as we have already noted,
the "thing" nearly always acquires the "defect" with which it is
tainted solely because of the unreasonable conduct of the defendant
who was charged with its custody or control. Thence negligence is
the essential default that must be established irrespective of
whether the harm should be attributed to a person or to a thing. If
negligence remains the vital ingredient under either attack, is it not
preferable to avoid a bifurcated assault and proceed directly and
openly to explore the factors that go into the makeup of the risk
and determine whether it is reasonable or unreasonable?
In the introductory pages of this article the reader's attention
was called to an apparent inconsistency in Justice Tate's opinion in
Loescher v. Parr." After observing that the victim must prove that
the thing in question caused an "unreasonable risk of injury" the
72. See text at pp. 981, 982, supra.
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opinion then proceeds to deny that the victim need establish any
personal negligent act or inattention on the part of the defendant.
This judicial concept of a risk that is unreasonable although it is untainted by any negligence on the part of its guardian is certain to afford difficulty. Especially is this true when its administration is entrusted to a lay juryman. The following excerpt from the recent
opinion in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co. is interesting:
The initial decision of whether a thing poses an unreasonable
risk of harm is one of law for the court to make and must be
based upon the court's appreciation of whether reasonable minds
can differ on the point. If the court believes the thing does present an unreasonable risk of harm, or that reasonable minds
could differ, only then is it appropriate to instruct the jury on
the law set forth in Article 2317 of our Civil Code. Even in this
instance, the jury should be cautioned that if it finds the thing
does not pose an unreasonable risk of harm, negligence must be
proved in order to permit recovery .... 13
Finally, a recent attempt by the supreme court to fathom the
mystery of the unreasonable risk existing without any actionable
negligence betrays the uncertainty with which the conception is
fraught. The case in question, Shipp v. City of Alexandria," arose
from an injured ankle sustained by an elderly plaintiff as she stepped unassisted off the curb into the street. Her foot landed in a
"hole or crack," resulting in the injury complained of. The nature of
the physical condition of the street was not clearly detailed in the
testimony. It was described by the victim as a "'hole about an inch
and a half to two inches deep.'"" The opinion conceded without
question that a defect existed, but the majority of the court was of
the opinion that the defect was not "so unreasonable as to justify
the imposition of non-negligence liability."7 The court failed to indicate what additional feature was needed in order to render the
risk unreasonable. However, a concurring opinion by Justice Lemmon undertook to explain: "[W]hen the risk is weighed against the
utility of the City's operation of public streets, I cannot say that the
risk of harm was unreasonable."7 It appears clear from this observation that Justice Lemmon is engaging in the kind of balacing operation that is typical of an administration of negligence. The game, he
73. Kent v. Gulf States Util. Co., 398 So. 2d 560, 568 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
74.

395 So. 2d 727 (La. 1981).

75. Id. at 729.
76. Id.
77. d. at 730 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
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concluded, was worth the candle. A dissenting opinion by Justice
Dennis insisted that the defect did involve an unreasonable risk of
injury, and he added significantly that the plaintiff might properly
recover under a theory of negligence.78
The Louisiana court, by adopting an approach based on liability
for the acts of defective things commits itself to a change with farreaching implications. The departure from negligence amounts to
more than a slighting of the familiar standard of reasonable care.
The shift works an abandonment of the entire operating network
upon which negligence depends. Negligence, when viewed in its full
breadth, embraces an elaborate assemblage of rules, doctrines and
procedures: It contemplates a body of diverse duties. These vary
with the standing of the parties involved, with the nature of the interest invaded by the defendant and with the manner in which the
alleged invasion took place (whether by act or omission). The scope
of protection afforded by these duties is brought under continuous
review by the courts as they administer successive controversies,
and enlargements are constantly being recognized. The negligence
network also encompasses a series of accepted procedures for the
establishment of claims in the courtroom. These, too, undergo improvements as the stream of litigation continues. Other functioning
parts that go into the makeup of the negligence system include the
defenses of contributory (or comparative) negligence and assumption
of risk. These defenses, as we are learning,"9 cannot be divorced
from the remainder of the negligence complex without confusion, for
they are integral parts of the balancing operation.
In contrast with this array of machinery and doctrine stands the
new approach under which liability is tackled initially through
resort to a mechanical inquiry concerning the existence or nonexistence of an act of a thing which serves as the source of a harm.
The court must then undertake to determine whether the injurious
thing could be regarded as defective. Thereafter, assuming that
these inquiries are answered in the affirmative, the attention of the
court must be shifted toward a consideration of these possible
defenses. The purpose here is to afford the defendant the opportunity to show that the injury complained of was not caused by the act
of the thing, as contended, but was the result of the act of the vic-

78. Id. (Dennis, J., dissenting).
79. Note the difficulties in determining a proper role for contributory negligence
whenever a theory of no-fault liability is employed. See, e.g., Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So.
2d 559 (La. 1981).
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tim himself, or the act of a third person, or that it was caused by a
force majeure. This search obliges the court to struggle anew with
the problem of proximate cause. The unhappy result is that the trier
is obliged to select the "real" or "substantial" cause of the plaintiff's
harm. He must devise some mystique to determine when and under
what circumstances the victim's own behavior or the act of the third
person should be accepted as the responsible cause and thus relieve
the defendant of liability.
In conclusion, this writer confesses that he is sorely perplexed
by the co-existence of two sharply contrasting doctrinal networks.
He finds it difficult to discover any substantial gain in the administration of justice that can justify the complications and artificialities that beset the newly emerged doctrine of liability for the
acts of things. One would not question that the administration of
tort law in the past has stood in need of considerable reform. But
within recent years gratifying reforms have been put into effect at a
healthy pace. The changes have been candid: Immunities are disappearing, many previously recognized interests such as privacy, mental suffering and prenatal injury have attained a fully protected
status; persons injured on the premises of others are now receiving
a more generous legal protection; previously recognized defenses
such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk are either
giving way or have been honed down to a more modest proportion;
the proper quantum of damage to be awarded for hurts is being
revised upward; the strategic situation of the plaintiff with
reference to the proof he must afford to justify recovery has been
liberalized substantially. These and numerous other changes in torts
administration are achieving recognition in the regular course of administration while at the same time no violent upset in the basic
structure of negligence has been necessary. Quite to the contrary,
the plasticity of the negligence concept and its capacity to adjust
itself to an everchanging world strongly recommends it as a vehicle
that should not lightly be cast aside.

